

2015 Annual Summary

Terrorism and CT Activity Data and Trends



Data on fatalities in terrorist attacks


2015 saw an increase in the number of people killed in terrorist attacks originating in Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria: **28 deaths**, as opposed to 20 in 2014. 25 of the fatalities were civilians (22 Israelis, 2 foreign nationals, and one Palestinian). The other three were security forces personnel.

The number of fatalities surged in late 2015, as a result of the wave of violence that broke out in October – 24 people were killed during October-December, as opposed to 4 people in the preceding nine months.

Most fatal were the shooting attacks: 16 killed (5 in a combined attack of shooting and stabbing). Other types of attacks: **stabbing** – 8 fatalities, **ramming** – 3 fatalities, and a **stone-throwing** attack that resulted in one fatality.

Below is a monthly distribution of fatalities according to types of attacks:

2015 monthly distribution of fatalities according to types of attacks



Most of the deaths caused by terrorist attacks in 2015 were registered in **Jerusalem** (10 killed) and **Judea** (12 killed). Four other people were killed in terrorist attacks **within Israel** (2 in Beersheba and 2 in Tel Aviv). Two people were killed in attacks that occurred in Samaria (near Itamar).


Data on casualties

239 people were injured in terrorist attacks in 2015¹, compared to 63 in 2014. The number of non-fatal casualties significantly increased in the last quarter (Oct.-Dec.) of 2015: 174 as opposed to 65 during January-September.

The types of attacks that resulted in **the most casualties in 2015 were stabbing – 114 injured, ramming – 70 injured, and small-arms shooting – 39 injured**. Other types of attacks included the use of firebombs (9 injured), IED (3 injured), assault (2 injured), and stone throwing (2 injured, with only moderately- or more severely-injured victims counted).

Below is a monthly distribution of casualties according to types of attacks:

2015 monthly distribution of casualties according to types of attacks




¹ Not including non-fatal casualties in riots or combat incidents. Non-fatal casualties of stone-throwing incidents: only the moderately and severely injured.


During the first nine months (Jan.-Sep. 2015), stabbing and ramming attacks were also the main cause of non-fatal casualties – 32 injured in stabbing attacks (with additional 82 injured in the last quarter), and 19 injured in ramming attacks (with additional 51 injured in the last quarter). However, during the last quarter of 2015, **the number of people injured in shooting attacks surged – 34**, as opposed to 5 during the first nine months.

Below are comparison graphs showing the numbers of fatalities and casualties in recent years:

Annual distributions of fatalities



Annual distributions of non-fatal casualties



*During 2014, 312 more people were injured during operation Protective Edge

Judea Samaria and Jerusalem

2015 saw a slight decrease in the number of attacks in Judea and Samaria: 1,719 as opposed to 1,793 in 2014. **The level of attacks, however, increased,** and consequently – the number of **fatalities**: 14 people were killed in J&S in 2015, 12 in Judea and 2 in Samaria, as opposed to 5 in 2014, all in Judea.

Judea was the site of most attacks, as in 2014 – 1,368 attacks were executed in Judea, while 351 – in Samaria. In 2014, 1,342 attacks were carried out in Judea, and 451 – in Samaria.


The decrease in the number of attacks in J&S **was manifest primarily in the number of firebombs attacks – 1,349** attacks (1,086 in Judea and 263 in Samaria), as opposed to 1,507 in 2014 (1,136 in Judea and 371 in Samaria). **However, there was an increase in the number of other types of attacks: 73 shooting attacks** (compared to 50 in 2014), **and 240 IED attacks**, including pipe bombs and improvised grenades (compared to 222 in 2014). **Significant increase was registered in the number of stabbing attacks – 38** (compared to 3 in 2014), **and ramming attacks – 18** (compared to 3 in 2014).

The number of attacks in Jerusalem increased in 2015 – 635, as opposed to 346 in 2014, yet no increase was registered in the **number of fatalities – 10** in 2015, and 11 in 2014.

Most of the attacks in Jerusalem are grassroots terrorist attacks, with only a few executed using firearms. **More than 92% of the attacks (584)** were firebombs, 31 were stabbing attacks (compared to 5 in 2014), 5 were ramming attacks, and 2 were an assault and a stone throwing resulting in casualties.


Below is a graph of attacks (not including the throwing of firebombs) by region, according to types of attacks:

2015 comparison of attacks according to types and areas



Below is a comparison graph showing the numbers of firebomb throwing by region in recent years:

Annual comparison of firebomb throwing



The wave of terrorist attacks that broke out in the last quarter of 2015 was manifest predominantly in J&S and Jerusalem. Most of the attacks were stabbing and ramming attacks, with a few shooting and firearm attacks, and the perpetrators were of the young generation, mostly "lone-wolf" attackers. Jerusalem and Hebron and their surrounding areas were the main locus of the attacks.

During 2015, 84 stabbing attacks were carried out, most (69) as part of the wave of violence that began in October. Almost 50% of these attacks were executed in Jerusalem (31 attacks) and within the Green Line (15 attacks), and most of them were perpetrated by attackers from J&S and Jerusalem.


In 2015, as in the preceding year, the most prominent threat in Judea and Samaria was posed by Hamas, due to its efforts to reconstruct headquarters and military infrastructures in the West Bank. Significant increase was registered in the scope of attack-plotting activity directed by Hamas HQs in the Gaza Strip and abroad, **with the aim of advancing attacks in J&S.** By carrying out attacks away from the Gaza Strip, Hamas hoped to be able to build up its military capability, while also undermining the stability of the Palestinian Authority's government.

The Gaza Strip


During 2015, the number of attacks originating in the Gaza strip dropped from 121 in 2014 (not including combat incidents during operation Protective Edge), to **44 attacks** in 2015. These included 25 rocket-fire attacks, 2 mortar-fire attacks, 8 small-arms shootings (including sniper fire), 2 IEDs, 1 AT fire, and 6 firebombs. **The attacks did not result in any casualties.**

Below is a 2015 monthly distribution of attacks according to types of attacks:

2015 monthly distribution of attacks originating in the Gaza Strip




Annual comparison of attacks originating in the Gaza Strip



Below is a monthly distribution of rockets and mortar shells launched** from the Gaza Strip towards Israel:


2015 monthly distribution of rocket and mortar shell launchings**




*****Clarification: The launchings are the number of rockets / mortar shells launched. For example: One attack with a salvo of 3 rockets / mortar shells will be counted as one attack and 3 launchings***

Below is a 2005-2015 comparison graphs of rocket and mortar shell launchings** from Gaza Strip towards Israel:

Rocket launchings from Gaza Strip in 2005-2015**



Mortar shell launchings from Gaza Strip in 2005-2015**



*****Clarification: The launchings are the number of rockets / mortar shells launched. For example: One attack with a salvo of 3 rockets / mortar shells will be counted as one attack and 3 launchings***

Hamas – Building up military capabilities

During 2015, Hamas' policy was one of maintaining calm with Israel, and avoiding attacks originating in the Gaza Strip. Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip was mostly executed by dissident Salafi elements (ISIS and other Salafi-Jihadi groups), and was a result of Hamas' "revolving door" approach of arresting the dissidents, and then releasing them with a warning.

However, **extensive efforts were made by Hamas to direct and fund terrorist infrastructures in Judea and Samaria in order to encourage attacks in the West Bank.** Hamas operatives, who were deported to the Gaza Strip, and operatives of the West Bank branch of Hamas' HQ have been prominently involved with plotting attacks, transferring funds for terrorist attacks, and providing instructions for setting up weapons. **These efforts have been led by Saleh Arouri, head of the West Bank branch in Hamas' HQ abroad.**

Maintaining the calm in the Gaza Strip **allows Hamas to build up and strengthen its military capabilities.** As part of its build-up, Hamas' efforts to bring weapons into the Gaza Strip continue, in preparation for another military campaign against Israel. Additionally, Hamas makes great efforts to manufacture weapons – mainly rockets, mortar shells and UAVs, as well as set up an **extensive network of attack tunnels to be used against Israel,** and train special units to invade Israeli territory via the tunnels.

The Sinai Peninsula

As in the previous year, IS-Sinai (IS) continued directing its activity from the Sinai Peninsula (between al-Arish and Egyptian Rafah), while cooperating with Hamas.

The Egyptian army was the main target of terrorist activity in the Sinai Peninsula, including a large-scale attack in the Sheikh Zuweid area on 1 July 2015 that killed nearly 100 soldiers. Furthermore, IS claimed responsibility for the downing of a Russian plane that departed from Sharm el-Sheikh in the Sinai on 31 October 2015. According to the public claim of responsibility, the bomb was brought onto the plane hidden in a soft drink can.

Israel was targeted this year by one terrorist attack only – a rocket-fire attack that included 3 launches from the Sinai into Hevel Shalom in July of 2015. There were no casualties, and no harm was caused (one rocket fell within the Sinai territory). In 2014, 13 rocket-fire attacks were executed, most during operation Protective Edge.

Efforts to smuggle weapons into the Gaza Strip through the Sinai continued during 2015, but with fewer successful attempts, due to Egypt creating a buffer zone on the Egyptian side of the border (the Sinai Peninsula) and flooding smuggling tunnels with sea water.

CT activity

Over 3,100 terror suspects were arrested in 2015 as a result of ISA, IDF, and Israel Police counterterrorism activity. **More than a third of the detainees are Hamas operatives, and 83%** (2,575 detainees) **are residents of Judea and Samaria**, mostly (1,618 detainees) **Judea**. The detainees' questioning led to **1,933 indictments**.

239 major attack plots, mostly originating in Judea and Samaria, were foiled in 2015. The most prominent ones: **19 kidnappings** were planned, **12 suicide bombings**, 120 shootings, 41 IED detonations, **37 stabbings** and 10 ramming attacks.

During the questionings conducted in 2015, large quantities of weaponry were disclosed and seized, including 34 pistols, 143 guns, 3 explosives labs, dozens of IEDs and dozens of kilograms of explosives.

The past year saw **some major counterterrorism operations**: an extensive Hamas infrastructure (25 detainees, most of whom were students in the Abu Dis campus of Al-Quds University) was foiled. **This infrastructure's activity had been directed by Hamas' military branch in the Gaza Strip with the plan of executing mass murder attacks and suicide attacks in Israel.** The infrastructure recruited two suicide attackers from the Bethlehem area, **facilitators, residents of Jerusalem who enjoy the right of freedom of movement in Israel, and even an Israeli citizen – a Bedouin from Hura in the Negev, who agreed to facilitate a terrorist attack by smuggling an explosives belt or a car bomb into Israeli territory.** During questionings of the detainees by ISA, **an explosives lab** was traced in Abu Dis. The lab was used by the infrastructure, **and contained substantial quantities of various explosives that were seized** in December 2015.

Another **extensive Hamas infrastructure operating in the surrounding area of Nablus** was foiled in April 2015. Some of the infrastructure's leaders functioned as the regional headquarter, with the purpose of renewing Hamas activity, including terrorism, in Samaria. They laundered Hamas funds via a gold jewelry shop they owned. An estimated sum of \$4 million was found in the HQ's possession. This CT operation exposed a Hamas terrorist cell in the Far'a refugee camp in Jenin. **The cell's members procured binoculars and a night-vision device in preparation for future terrorist activity, which was not executed due to their arrest.** Two other Hamas cells plotting attacks were exposed and foiled – one was already in **very advanced stages of preparation for a shooting attack** against IDF forces in Abu Dis, including procurement of weaponry, shooting training and gathering of intelligence on the chosen target (March 2015). The second cell included residents of Qalqilya, who were recruited **by Hamas while in Jordan.** They went through **military training in the Gaza Strip, and were then sent to Samaria to advance attacks and recruit additional attackers.** Their

inquiry in January-February 2015 **revealed an explosives lab in an apartment in central Nablus. Materials used for the production of IED explosives were found and seized in the lab**, including dozens of kilograms of sulfur, and 25 grams of fulminating mercury.

Another major CT operation was the foiling of smugglings via Kerem Shalom border crossing of devices and materials aimed at building up military capabilities of terrorist elements in the Gaza Strip, chiefly Hamas. The smuggled materials and pieces of equipment require a special approval to be brought into the Gaza Strip, due to them being of dual-purpose, and used, among others, for the production of weapons. These include graphite and silver nitrate, along with equipment required by Hamas in order to build up its capabilities – **winchers, engines and compressors that are also used for excavating tunnels, various batteries, which serve as alternative energy sources, communication cables and steel devices.** The foiling operation resulted in the arrest of 70 people involved in the smugglings, half of whom were questioned by ISA, including Israeli citizens, residents of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, merchants, transporters, individuals who stored the materials, drivers and suppliers. **Additionally, over 100 seizures of restricted merchandise were executed.**

Terrorist headquarters still consider foreigners of different nationalities potential recruits that can be brought into Israeli territory for the purpose of conducting military activity. An example of such an attempt is the case of Hassan Khalil Khayzarane, Swedish citizen of Lebanese descent, who was arrested in July 2015 upon his arrival in Ben Gurion Airport. Khayzarane was recruited by Hizballah in 2009, and asked by his handlers to gather information on military and weaponry hubs, as well as military bases in Israel. He was also asked to recruit Israeli citizens, and individuals with ties to Jewish people, access to military and the security forces, or links to government officials.

Israeli Arabs

The involvement of Israeli Arabs in terrorist attacks **has increased over the past year, but remained minor.** However, during the wave of violence that broke out in October 2015, several prominent attacks were executed by Israeli Arabs – **a shooting attack in Beersheba Central Station** on 18 October, carried out by an Israeli Bedouin from Hura in the Negev, killed two and injured eight. Two additional attacks were executed by Israeli Arabs from Umm al-Fahm; **a ramming and stabbing attack in Gan Shmuel** on 11 October wounded four, **and a stabbing attack in Eilat** on 29 October resulted in one slight injury.

As of October, **protests by Israeli Arabs** have also escalated. **The escalation was mostly manifested by an increasing use of firebombs** thrown, among others, at Highway 6 on 5-7 and 11 October, at a police car in Jaffa on 8 October, at police forces in a demonstration in Umm al-Fahm on 7 October, and in Katzir on 8 October.

The issue of illegal aliens in Israel has been put back on the agenda, due to **the involvement of some of them in executing attacks during the wave of violence.** Most prominent were stabbing attacks perpetrated in 2015 by illegal aliens: one in **Tel Aviv** on 21 January, resulting in 18 non-fatal casualties, 3 severely injured; another attack in **Petah Tikva** on 7 October, resulting in one person slightly-moderately wounded; a stabbing in **Afula** on 8 October that resulted in one soldier moderately injured, and two stabbings in **Kiryat Gat** on 7 October (3 people slightly injured) and 21 November (four people moderately-severely injured).

Employers of illegal aliens, as well as individuals providing them with transportation or accommodation services, who turn a blind eye to their involvement in terrorist activities are, for all intents and purposes, accomplices.

Israeli Arabs continue to sympathize with IS' (Islamic State) ideology, and support the organization. This is mainly evident among young Israeli Arabs eager to travel to Syria **to fight alongside IS members.** Among other IS-affiliated groups that were exposed in 2015, one group was established by residents of Jaljulia. One of the group's members crossed the border from the Israeli Golan Heights to Syria on 24 October, using a paraglider. At present, we know of 32 Arab Israeli citizens who are currently in the Syrian combat arena. 7 Israeli Arabs were killed in the fights.

Since early 2015, **41 Israeli citizens were detained and questioned on grounds of supporting IS.** These are some of the most prominent cases:

- In August 2015, **three young Israeli Arabs from Yafia** were questioned. **Their questioning yielded information on an IS cell that they had formed with the aim of conducting terrorist activity in Israel. The cell members procured weapons, conducted shooting training, and plotted a shooting attack against an IDF base.** They also planned to throw firebombs at a police car at the police station in Migdal Haemek or Nazareth, and conduct activity against Arab businesses selling alcohol.
- In June 2015, a group of IS supporters was exposed in the Negev – **6 residents of Hura, four of whom are teachers in the Israeli school system.** The group members **spread IS' ideology** among their friends, acquaintances, and families, and among students and teachers in their school. **Some of them planned to travel and join the fighting among IS ranks in Syria.**

Prominent CT operations were the arrest, in August 2015, of the aforementioned IS group from Yafia, an administrative detention, in November, of a Yafia resident who informed his employer that he was on his way to execute an attack in Nazareth Ilit, and the announcement, in

November 2015, that the northern branch of the Islamic Movement is an illegal organization.

Another prominent operation in 2015 was the solving of a stun grenade attack at a Yeshiva complex in Jaffa, on 1 September, **by an Israeli Arab from Jaffa**. The attacker sought to compel dwellers of the complex, considered by him to be settlers seeking to seize control over the entire land, to move out.

Jewish Terrorism

16 terrorist attacks were carried out by Jewish attackers in 2015, the same number of attacks as in the year before. However, **the severity of the attacks increased, as well as the number of casualties**.

The most prominent attack was **the arson of the Dawabsheh family's home in the Palestinian town of Duma** in July. The attack killed three members of the family. Additionally, **5 people were wounded** as a result of stabbing and stone-throwing attacks, three severely injured, and two – moderately injured.

Two stabbing attacks were carried out by Jewish attackers in 2015, one stone-throwing attack at a driving vehicle that resulted in a severe injury, arsons of three holy sites – one mosque and two churches, and ten arson/firebombs attacks. Prominent ones were the arson in Duma mentioned above, the arson of Dormition Abbey in Jerusalem in February 2015, and arson of the Church of the Multiplication near Tiberias in July 2015.

Ten of the attacks were carried out in Judea and Samaria, three within the Green Line, and two in Jerusalem.

Collaborative efforts by ISA and the Israel Police led to **90 indictments in 2015**, 25 issued on grounds of attacks and attempted attacks.

4 activists were taken into administrative detention, and 45 administrative restraining orders were issued, including full/nightly house arrests, and removal from the Jerusalem area.

Effective CT operations: a terrorist cell on its way to execute an attack in the town of Beit Iksa near Jerusalem was foiled in April 2015, indictments were issued; the aforementioned **arson attack in Duma was solved, and indictments were issued**; arsons of the holy sites mentioned above were solved – three indictments were issued in the case of Dormition Abbey, and two indictments and administrative restriction orders – in the case of the Church of the Multiplication; indictments and restriction orders were issued in the case of arson of a Bedouin tent near the town of Malik/Ramallah in August 2015.

Three arson cases from 2014 were also solved in 2015: torching of a truck in the town of Yasuf, and arson of a granary in Aqraba, in July 2014, in the Nablus area – two indictments and three indictments were issued respectively; administrative removal was imposed in the case of arson of a house with its occupants in Khirbat Adirat near Hebron in December 2014.

Security and Terrorism Abroad

No attacks against Israeli targets were executed in 2015, as opposed to one shooting attack with no casualties perpetrated at the Israeli Embassy in Athens in December 2014. However, **attacks were carried out against Jewish targets in Europe**, including an attack at the Hyper Cacher in Paris in January 2015, and a shooting attack near Copenhagen's main synagogue in February 2015. Both incidents were originally attacks against local targets, but became attacks on Jewish targets.

The threat by Global Jihad, mainly IS, on various targets worldwide, including Jewish/Israeli ones, increased in 2015. Thousands of fighters

from Europe and other countries around the world travel to combat arenas in Syria and Iraq, gain military and combat experience, and pose a significant threat as they return to their home countries. A threat is also posed by local operatives who don't travel to combat arenas, but are nonetheless influenced by Jihadi groups' radical ideology. **Another threat is the possibility of terrorists infiltrating countries among migrants or refugees heading to Europe in droves.** A relevant example is that of the coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015. The attackers, affiliated with IS – some were returnees from the battles in Syria, others infiltrated Europe in the guise of Syrian migrants – used suicide bombers wearing explosive belts, and mass shooting.

The threat, posed by the same Jihadi elements, on international airliners, was accentuated in 2015. According to estimates, IS brought down the Russian plane that departed from the Sinai Peninsula in October 2015. The plane was downed using a bomb that was smuggled into the plane.

During 2015, Shiite terrorist elements – Iran and Hizballah – continued to establish terrorist infrastructures for future attacks against Israeli targets worldwide. One such case is an apartment exposed in Cyprus in May 2015 – the apartment was used by Hizballah to store 8 tons of precursors for the production of explosives.

Israeli Cyber Security

In 2015, Israel's various enemies expanded their manifold cyber activity. Most manifest was the use of social networks and other web-based activities for the purpose of inciting and encouraging terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets. Such activity, benefitting from wide access to a large target audience, challenges attempts of preemptive detection and foiling of terrorist plots.

In the face of these cyber challenges, ISA's cyber units made efforts to gather information on enemy cyber activity in order to disrupt and prevent it using the cyberspace. Various active measures were applied for the purpose of identifying the most influential incitement channels, as well as the elements behind the incitement on social networks, and tracing and arresting suspected potential attackers to disrupt and prevent plans of terrorist attacks.

In 2015 Israel remained a target of cyber security threats for the purposes of espionage, vandalism and terrorism. Cyber-attacks have become a significant part of the toolkit used by enemies for attacks. These tools build up the enemies' offensive capabilities, not merely of kinetic military action, but also cybernetic means to be used in a war against Israel. These cyber-attacks **by Iran, Hizballah and others**, were aimed mostly at the Israeli government, as well as various security and civilian infrastructures, and targets in the Israeli civilian cyberspace. **The attacks were traced and foiled before any substantial damage was inflicted, and in many cases, prior to the enemy achieving its goals.** All this was made possible due to continuous effective collaboration of ISA with other security forces, as well as with those who were targeted by the attacks. The collaboration was based on the offensive-defense approach, combining a variety of capabilities that are also implemented in other arenas of ISA activity.
