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Arrest of an Iranian intelligence agent sent to Israel by IRGC
Iranian intelligence agent sent to Israel by the Iranian IRGC was arrested; photographs of the USA embassy were found in his possession. This individual was recruited by Iranian IRGC Special Operations unit, which is in charge of many terror attacks worldwide.

During the ISA interrogation, the Iranian detainee, Ali Mansouri, who had entered Israel with a Belgian passport under the name of Alex Mans, described his recruitment and handling by Iranian intelligence elements.

 

The detainee, a businessman, Belgian citizen of Iranian descent was recruited by the Iranian IRGC and sent to Israel in order to establish business firms, which would serve as a platform for clandestine activity of the Iranian regime apparatuses against Israeli and Western interests. In exchange for this activity, he was promised a sum of one million dollars.

 

Mansouri's handling in Israel was carried out by the Quds Force Special Operations unit, headed by Hamed Abdolahi and Majid Alavi; the commander of IRGC Quds Force is Ghassem Soleimani.

 

The Special Operations unit is in charge, inter alia, for the execution of attacks against Israel – abroad as well as in Israel – and against other Iranian targets in the West and the Middle East.

Iran tried to use the detainee in order to bypass the embargo on trade and financial transactions.

 

The detainee had held three visits in Israel using his Belgian identity. He tried to develop business relations and contracts with business owners in Tel Aviv. He was arrested by ISA and the police's unit of International Crime Investigations at Ben Gurion Airport on his way to Europe.

 

The suspicion: The business firms were intended to conceal intensive intelligence and terror activities carried out by the Iranian apparatuses.

 

During the night of September 11 2013, the Israel Security Agency (ISA) and the Israeli police (unit of International Crime Investigations) arrested a Belgian citizen by the name of Alex Mans, while trying to depart from Israel via Ben Gurion Airport. Up to now, the ISA interrogation revealed that the Belgian citizen, b. 1958, is of Iranian descent and has an Iranian citizenship. His original name is Ali Mansouri and was sent to Israel by Iranian intelligence elements for the execution of various missions.

 

Mansouri was born in Iran and lived there with his family until 1980. In 1980 he moved to Turkey where he resided until 1997. In Turkey he began to develop business activities.

 

Due to his business activity, in 1997 Mansouri received a visa which allowed him to reside in Belgium. In 2006, after marrying a Belgian woman, he received a Belgian citizenship, whom he later divorced. In addition, in 2006 he changed his name to Alex Mans in order to conceal his Iranian identity.

 

During his interrogation, Mansouri revealed that in 2007 he had returned to Iran and acted to expand his business activity in Iran, Belgium and Turkey. During these years he resided alternately in Iran, Turkey and Brussels. He also married an Iranian citizen. His European citizenship and business activity singled him out as an attractive target for recruitment by the Iranian intelligence elements.

 

Over the years, contacts were established with Mansouri by various elements of the regime apparatuses and in early 2012 he was explicitly offered to act on their behalf against the state of Israel.

 

Mansouri was instructed by his handlers to set up a business infrastructure in Israel which would conceal the intelligence activity of Iran in Israel and be used by the Iranian elements for various purposes in the region. For this purpose, he was instructed to make a visit in Israel, establish business ties and sign contracts leading to continued business activity.

 

He was promised large sums of money to fund his activity; a sum of one million dollars was mentioned. Mansouri made two previous short trips to Israel, in July 2012 and January 2013 according to the instructions of his handlers in the Iranian Intelligence.

 

His most recent visit began on September 6 and as aforementioned ended upon his arrest at Ben Gurion Airport on September 11 2013.
Following his handlers' instructions, Mansouri used a business cover of trading in and marketing windows and roofing for stores and restaurants and tried to establish business relations with business owners in Tel Aviv.

 

He always introduced himself as a Belgian businessman and even used websites and a Facebook profile presenting his alleged business activity.
Upon his arrest, many photographs of various sites in Israel which are of interest to the Iranian intelligence elements such as the building of the USA Embassy at Ha'Yarkon Street in Tel Aviv were found in his possession.

 

During his ISA interrogation, Mansouri described his many month recruitment and handling and delivered many details on his handlers and their methods of communication.

 

Mansouri delivered information on his Iranian handlers. Below is information on some of them:

 

Haji Mustafa – senior HQ official; he met Mansouri and asked him about the status of Mansouri's missions in Israel.

 

Haji Hamid Ne'emati – the main point of contact.

 

Haji Mustafa – a handler; he attended the meetings with Mansouri.

 

Mahdi Hanebabai – guided Mansouri's missions in Israel.

Mansouri also delivered that he had been instructed by his handlers to conceal his arrivals in Iran; after his trips to Israel he travelled to Iran in order to report to his handlers and receive their guidance.

 

Mansouri's Iranian handlers hoped that his Belgian identity would allow him to bypass the strict Israeli security checks at Ben Gurion Airport.

 

Please note that IRGC Quds Force is behind the attack in which a woman employee of the Israeli Embassy in Delhi was injured (February 2012), the attack attempts in Bangkok and Tbilisi (February 2012) and several attacks that were prevented in recent years (Azerbaijan, Kenya, Nigeria).

Mansouri was instructed by his handlers to set up a business infrastructure in Israel which would conceal the intelligence activity of Iran in Israel and be used by the Iranian elements for various purposes in the region

 
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