English
English
Arabic Hebrew
HomePage
Archive
Monthly Reports
Weekly Reports
Annual Reports
Operation "Cast Lead"
Operation "Cast Lead" – Special Summary - 13 Days of Fighting in the South
Operation "Cast Lead" - Current to December 27, 2008 – January 3, 2009
Selected Examples of Interrogations Following Operation Cast Lead
Operation "Cast Lead" – Special Summary - 13 Days of Fighting in the South
13 days have passed since the beginning of Operation "Cast Lead" (December 27, 2008) initiated in order to restore the quiet to the citizens of southern Israel. The first stage of the operation included a week of air strikes on targets, and in the beginning of the second week (January 3, 2009), the ground offensive began.
Operation "Cast Lead" – Special Summary 

Interim Summary – 13 Days of Fighting in the South
During the operation, high-trajectory missile fire towards Israel, led by Hamas, has continued, including long-range Grad missiles, which were fired towards "new" targets including Ashdod, Gedera and Beersheva. This has been alongside the continued fire towards Sderot, Ashkelon, Netivot, and the Western Negev towns.
During this period, more than 450 rockets have been fired from the Gaza Strip towards Israel, of which 10% were long-range (about 40 km). 11 Israelis have been killed since the beginning of the operation: 4 from rocket fire and mortars (3 civilians and one soldier); and seven soldiers during the ground fighting in the Gaza Strip (current till January 8, 2009, at 15:00).

Hamas was surprised by both the attack and its extent. Hamas authorities who
announced the end of the "Lull" (December 19 2008) and increased the rocket fire against Israel after its conclusion, did not accurately estimate Israel's reaction, and were surprised, not only by the attack itself but also by its extent and by the quality of Israel's intelligence information.
During the operation, nearly 900 targets, largely of Hamas, were attacked in the Gaza Strip. The major blow was absorbed by the production and storage apparatus for rockets and other weapons, the support infrastructures for fighting, as well as the system of tunnels for smuggling weapons on the Philadelphian Axis, on the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. Significant damage was done to Hamas governmental structures
as well.

Hamas suffered a significant blow in the Gaza Strip, however, Hamas currently
preserves its ability as a semi-military terror organization. The senior military command of Hamas, which went underground immediately at the beginning of the operation, has succeeded in preserving a reasonable level of control over the forces, and directs the fighting from underground bunkers and tunnels which had been prepared in advance throughout the Gaza Strip. That said, some damage has been caused at the intermediate level of commanders, including some regional commanders such as: Mamduh Jamal and Mustafa Dalul (Gaza City) as well as Muhammad Ibrahim Shaer (Rafiah). In addition, the houses of a large number of field commanders have been destroyed; these houses were used as weapon storage facilities and as war rooms for directing the fighting, and were targeted by the IDF.
The rocket infrastructure has also suffered personnel losses, including the ounding of Iman Siyam, the head of the rocket infrastructure, as well as Muhammad Akram Shibat and Husam Muhammad Hamdan, the commanders of artillery in Beit Hanoun and Khan Younis, respectively.

The rocket production and storage apparatus, as well as the launching sites and cells, have also been severely damaged, but have not yet been totally destroyed. It must be emphasized that Hamas prepared in advance for the IDF entry into the Gaza Strip, and established underground structures for launching rockets, fortified bunkers, and a system of underground tunnels linking launching sites, storage facilities and war rooms for managing the war.
Regarding the Palestinian public
Due to the fact that Hamas commanders and senior officials have gone underground, as well as the fact that many Hamas elements operate from underground installments prepared in advance, the feeling on the Palestinian “street” is that civilians have been the primary victims. It can be said that Hamas fights until the last drop of blood –civilian blood.
Hamas opponents point an accusing finger towards Hamas, who they view as the primary element responsible for the damage to civilian population. These elements criticize Hamas and its commanders, who "took care of themselves but abandoned the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip."

And what about Hamas?
It seems that Hamas feels pressured, and not only because of the damage to its ability to govern the Gaza Strip. This can be seen in the Hamas effort to hide the extent of the damage it has suffered, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the false news reports sent to the media, particularly concerning civilian casualties (for example, the report that Israel had targeted the al-Shifa' hospital in Gaza) as well as false reports of successes. An additional aspect is its effort to use terror on the Palestinian street and to persecute their opponents, in order to continue to survive.

 
שתף

BackPrintSend Mail
© 2010 All rights reserved